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INSURANCE-1961 TENNESSEE SURVEY
ROBERT N. COVINGTON*

I. WHAT IS INSURANCE?
II. CONTROL OF RISKS
A. Descriptionof Insured Property
B. Exclusion Clauses
1. Life Insurance-Double Indemnity-Exclusion for Military Maneuvers
2. Group Life Policy-Age Exclusion
3. Service Station Liability Policy
4. Automobile Liability Policy-Employee Exclusion
C. Good Health as a ConditionPrecedent
III. SERVICING THE CONTRACT

A. Change of Beneficiary
B. Effect of Statute of Limitations on Liability to Third Parties
C. Duty To Settle

The developments in the Tennessee law of insurance during the past
year were important without being surprising. The various courts

delivered opinions dealing with a number of the central issues in
insurance law, especially in the field of risk control, and by and large
followed the line of thinking established by past years. Many of the
decisions are of less significance than one might suppose, because of
their extreme involvement in particular fact situations.
I. WHAT IS INSURANCE?

In State ex rel. Long v. Mynatt' the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled
on the constitutionality and application of a 1959 amendment to the
Code which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any life insurance company ... to enter into any
contract with any citizens of this state, contracting and agreeing to furnish
funeral merchandise or services upon the death of any person insured.
It shall further be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to issue
any policy or certificate, or to enter into any contract, conditioned to take
effect on the death of any person, wherein such person, or the personal
representative, heirs or next of kin of such person, is promised any rebate,
discount or reduction in price for or on account of funeral merchandise,
*Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; faculty editor, Vanderbilt Law Review.
1. 339 S.W.2d 26 (Tenn. 1960).
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expenses or services by virtue of his being issued such policy or certifi2
cate ....
Defendant Mynatt, who operated the Mynatt Funeral Home, had in
the preceding twenty years entered into some 35,000 "discount contracts" which provided that the purchaser of the contract or his
personal representative was to receive a fifty per cent discount on
funeral services and supplies. In this action, the state insurance commissioner charged that Mynatt was violating the section quoted above
and that he was guilty of conducting a life insurance business without
complying with the regulations imposed on an insurer.
Mynatt offered two defenses: (1) He urged that the contracts he
issued were not insurance contracts but simply contracts for the sale
of goods and services since the person paying for the contract could
purchase merchandise before his death if he so desired. This would
mean that the contract was not one that depended upon the contingency of death. (2) He also argued that the 1959 statute outlawing
the issuance of any policy, contract, or certificate calling for discounts
on funeral services was unconstitutional because it unreasonably discriminated against a single group.
The supreme court, through Chief Justice Prewitt, held against
defendant on both counts. By deciding that these contracts for burial
services are essentially insurance contracts to be performed on the
death of the party to whom the contract was issued, the court followed its earlier decision in State ex rel. Attorney General v. Smith
Funeral Service.3 In that case, as in the instant decision, a funeral
home had issued a discount contract under which the party holding
the contract certificate could call on the funeral home to provide a
casket at any time. The court, in Smith, said:
The nature of a business pursued by anyone is not determined by the
things that may possibly be done in that business or by things that possibly have been done. It is determined rather by the usual course of the
particular business.
We may safely assume that the sale of burial outfits to its customers
during their lives is not according to defendant's usual course of business. 4
Surely one must agree that these contracts are in practice insurance
contracts, conditioned on the death of the contract holder, no matter
5
what the funeral director may call them.
The more interesting point in controversy is the constitutional issue.
Is it not undue discrimination against funeral directors to prohibit the
2. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-3208 (Supp. 1961).
3. 177 Tenn. 41, 145 S.W.2d 1021 (1940).

4. Id. at 44, 145 S.W.2d at 1023.
5. The overwhelming majority of decisions have found such contracts to
be contracts of insurance. See VANCE, INSURANCE § 10, at 87 (1951).
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issuance of discount contracts such as these? The court held "no" and

upheld the legislation, explaining its position by giving an illustration
of the potential abuse to which these contracts are subject:

The de-

fendant in this action had issued 35,000 of these contracts, each promising a fifty per cent discount on burial supplies and services. If the
average contract was for $500, then the value of all the contracts on
their face would be $17,500,000; half of this, or $8,750,000 would be the

potential liability of the funeral home. Such a potential liability,
especially on the part of a non-insurer who is unlikely to have his

program funded with the actuarial precision of a professional insurer,
presents a picture of prospective financial disaster. For this reason,
the court held, it was reasonable and proper for the state legislature to

single out this type of transaction for regulation or prohibition.
II. CONTROL OF RISKS
A. Descriptionof Insured Property
In McKee v. Potomac Insurance Co.6 the state supreme court was
called on to construe the clause in a casualty policy which extended
coverage to "additions and repairs" to specifically described property.
Plaintiff in the case was the owner of a motel in Shelbyville, Tennessee. In 1951, he purchased a fire policy from defendant in which this
coverage description appeared: "Approved roof, two story, concrete
block and brick Tourist dwelling and office, containing 11 units, situated 211 Madison Street, Shelbyville, Tennessee." In 1953, plaintiff
purchased a house on an adjoining lot which he converted into three
additional motel units; he apparently did not notify the insurer of
this move. In 1956, a renewal policy was issued to plaintiff; the property description was identical with the description in the first policy,
no mention being made of the three added units. In 1957, these three
new units were destroyed by fire. Plaintiff has brought this action
for reimbursement for his losses due to that destruction.
In the court below, the suit was dismissed on the ground that the
policy showed on its face that these three units were not covered.
Plaintiff has prosecuted this appeal arguing that there was coverage
under the "additions and repairs" clause and that the insurer was
under a duty to determine the location of the subject matter of the
policy and to state this accurately in the contract.
The supreme court held against the insured on both counts. In its
opinion these three units were not additions and repairs in the sense
of that clause, but new property which was independent of the
original covered property. The clause was construed to refer to "some
6. 344 S.W.2d 366 (Tenn. 1961).
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small addition or work done on the particular units described and
not.., the building of additional units. ' 7
While the court did not dwell upon it at any length, the opinion
gives the impression that the fact that the renewal policy specifically
stated "11 units" was of considerable significance. Had the policy
said simply that it covered a motel in Shelbyville, Tennessee, the
result might possibly have been different.
On the second count, the court held that while the insurer might
be under a duty to make sure a property description was accurate
when it issued the first policy on such property, it is entitled to rely
upon the description in the policy when it receives a request for a
renewal policy without any notice of a change in the situation.8
This opinion, like that in so many insurance cases, is so centered
in its factual context that its legal significance is limited. The coverage
of any insurance policy is, of course, a matter of the expressed intent
of the parties. To assess that intent many factors must be looked to,
including the particular language describing coverage, the use to
which the allegedly covered property is put, the extent of change and
alteration that has taken place since the policy was issued, and the
like. One confronted with this sort of problem must compile his arguments in the most effective possible manner, and should look diligently
into the secondary sources for references to cases that approximate his
own. 9
B. Exclusion Clauses
The exclusion clause has become a favorite device by which the
insurer attempts to control risks. It is used to remove certain risks
from the policy which otherwise would be included under general coverage provisions. The Tennessee cases decided during the past year
involved exclusion provisions in both life and liability policies.
1. Life Insurance-Double Indemnity-Exclusion for Military Maneuvers.-In Bennett v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,10 an extremely brief opinion written by Mr. Justice Burnett, the Tennessee
Supreme Court dealt with the issue whether an exclusion clause was
ambiguous so as to require application of the familiar rule that ambiguous clauses in a contract of adhesion are construed strictly against
its maker. In this case, insured was covered by a $2,000 life policy
which included a double indemnity clause for death caused by accidental means. Insured was killed in an accident while on a routine
7. Id. at 368.
8. Ibid.
9. See, e.g., 4

1 COuNCH,

APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
CYCLOPEDIA ON INSURANCE §§ 6:7-:28 (2d ed.

A.L.R.2d 606 (1951).

10. 337 S.W.2d 9 (Tenn. 1960).

§§ 2323-29 (1941);

1959); Annot., 19
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training mission as a rear gunner in the armed forces. The defendant
insurer declined to pay double indemnity benefits and this suit was
brought to recover them.
The double indemnity provision of the policy included a number of
exclusions. Exclusion (d) provided that no double indemnity benefits
would be paid if the insured was killed in flight if he had any duties
with regard to the flight or if the accident resulting in death occurred
while in flight during training or maneuvers of the armed forces.
Exclusion (f) excluded coverage "while the Insured is in the military
forces of any country at war." Following this list of exclusions
...
in the policy was a paragraph providing for the termination of the
policy for non-payment of premiums. Then appeared this paragraph:
"This provision shall be suspended during any period while the Insured is in the military.., forces of any country at war .... ." Plaintiff's theory was that this last quoted paragraph created an ambiguity
because it could not be ascertained which clause or clauses the words
"this provision" referred to. Had the court agreed, there would have
been an ambiguity which would have been resolved in favor of the
beneficiary. Instead, however, the court held that these words clearly
referred to the double indemnity provision, and not to the exclusions.
This being the case, the supreme court upheld the chancellor below
who had sustained a demurrer to the bill."
The decision seems reasonable. One would suspect, however, that
insurers would in the future be more cautious in using pronouns in
long complex sections, lest they be construed to refer to material
which the insurer did not intend. The rash strewing of pronouns
without clear referents is one of the worst habits of the writers of
"legalese," whether in deeds, wills, or insurance policies. Surely the
cost of printing this policy would not have been greatly increased by
making the allegedly ambiguous phrase read: "This double indemnity
benefits provision."
2. Group Life Policy-Age Exclusion.-Zarzour v. Southern Life
Insurance Co. 12 involved a group life policy which provided that at
age 65 benefits would be cut in half and that at age 70 they would be
terminated. The policy was so designed in order that the Tennessee
11. One minor additional point deserves mention. In the closing paragraph
of the original opinion, Mr. Justice Burnett inadvertently stated that "the
having accepted this policy with this provision in it is bound
insured ...
thereby .... " Actually, exclusion (d) as applicable in this case was an
amended version of the clause that appeared in the original policy issued to
decedent. On petition to rehear, it was apparently argued that this clause
should not be enforced since it was not in the original policy accepted by
decedent. The court disposed of this argument by noting that the amendment
was more liberal than the original clause, so that petitioner had no ground
for complaint on this point.
12. 333 S.W.2d 14 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
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Restaurant Association, whose members were covered by it, could
obtain a minimum premium rate. Richard Zarzour, a member of the
association, had paid premiums for several years on a policy formerly
held through the association which contained no age limit; he continued to pay under the instant policy even though over 70 and in
spite of the fact that the group certificate which was issued to him
stated that persons over that age were ineligible. No application was
required for the policy and although the broker who arranged for the
contract might have been able to ascertain Zarzour's age by inspecting
the association's membership records, he apparently did not do so.
Upon Zarzour's death, the insurer learned for the first time of his
age; they consequently refused to pay benefits and this suit has been
prosecuted against them.
The court held that an age exclusion such as the one involved in
this case is valid and does not violate the Tennessee statute forbidding
a settlement at maturity of less than the amount insured (adjusted
for premium payments). As Judge McAmis stated in the opinion, an
age exclusion is just that, an exclusion; it is not a mode of settlement.
The court also held that where no application is submitted to the
company by the individual from which the company could be informed about age, the company is not under a duty to search out this
data. 13 This holding should not be thought unreasonable; the insured,
after all, was given a certificate which plainly stated that no benefits
were to be paid past age 70. Surely the insured as well as the insurer
has a duty to be informed about the contents of the policy.
The decision seems on the whole a wise one. It permits the insurer
to have sufficient control of risks to justify offering a special premium.
The case follows the reasoning of an earlier Tennessee decision 14
and is in accord with holdings in many other states.15
3. Service Station Liability Policy.-The basic coverage provision of
the service station liability policy involved in Hardware Mutual Cas-

ualty Co. v. Cox' 6 obligated the insurer to defend against and pay
damages awarded in actions against the service station operator for
bodily injury and property damage "arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of the premises for the purpose of an automobile
service station, and all operations necessary or incidental thereto; and
the use in connection with such operations of customers' automobiles
while in charge of the named insured for servicing." There was also
an exclusion clause in the policy stating that the policy does not apply
13. If the insurer had such knowledge it should be liable at least for the
return of premiums. See VANCE, INSURANCE § 93 n.22 (1951).
14. McLain v. American Glanzstoff Corp., 166 Tenn. 1, 57 S.W.2d 554 (1933).
15. See VANCE, INSURANCE § 93 n.14 (1951).
16. 340 S.W.2d 263 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1960).
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to "the use of the premises for... engine or body repair.., or the use
of customers' automobiles in connection with" engine or body repair.
A regular customer of the service station operated by defendant had
left her car with the station for installation of a battery and other
usual services. While defendant's employees were at work on the
vehicle they discovered that its water pump was defective and needed
replacement. The customer asked defendant if he would locate a used
pump for her. One of the employees of the station thereupon used
the customer's car to go to a nearby shop where he thought he might
find such an item. While returning to the station, this employee
struck and killed a pedestrian. The service station operator is being
sued as a result. Insurer brought this declaratory judgment action
to determine whether it was obliged to defend; the lower court held
for the insured.
. The sole issue in the case, therefore, was whether the suit against
the service station arose out of its operation as a service station (in
which case the insurer would be obliged to defend) or as a repair
shop (in which case there would be no duty to defend). This is essentially a factual rather than a purely legal question; the decision of the
appellate court is based on a finding that the lower court was reasonable in concluding from the proof that was offered that the defendant's
activities were not such that they fell within the exclusion. This proof,
according to the court's summary, included testimony to the effect
that this was the sort of errand which might customarily be run for
customers by a service station. There was no proof that the station
had promised to install the pump when located, or that it held itself
out to the public as a general repair shop. Since the burden of proof
in this action was on the insurer,- the court felt that the absence of
such a showing was decisive.
While not of great legal import, the case is significant as an illustration of the difficulties that can arise in interpreting and applying
exclusion clauses. 17 These difficulties are multiplied when the distinction between covered activities and excepted activities is a fine
one-as, for example, the distinction between the activities of a service station and those of a repair shop, both of which are engaged in
similar lines of work.
4. Automobile Liability Policy.-Employee Exclusion.-In First
National Bank v. South CarolinaInsurance Co.,18 plaintiff's decedent
had been issued a standard automobile liability policy which contained
17. For a discussion of some of the difficulties that can arise .with those
exclusions which appear in standard automobile policies, see Plummer, Autonobile Policy Exclusions, 13 VAND. L. REv. 945 (1960).
18. 341 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. 1960).
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the usual exclusion, "This policy does not apply.., to bodily injury to
any employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of...
employment by the insured . . . ." Decedent was killed in an automobile accident which occurred while he was driving. A guest in the
car at the time was injured; he sued the decedent's administrator alleging in his declaration that he (the guest) was an employee of
decedent. The administrator referred the case to the defendant insurer, telling the company that the allegation that the guest was
employed by decedent was untrue. The company nonetheless refused
to defend on the ground that the employee exclusion clause applied.
The administrator thereupon retained counsel and successfully defended against the guest's action. He now seeks in this suit to have
the estate reimbursed for its expenses in this defense.
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the trial court denying
relief. The court held that a liability insurer is not obligated to defend
in a suit against its insured when the declaration in such suit states
facts which would make the case fall within a policy exclusion, even
though the insured informs the insurer that the allegation which
would forestall coverage is untrue.
A great many other jurisdictions also hold that the declaration in
the suit against the insured determines the obligation to defend. 19 The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the courts of Missouri have
adopted a variant rule, however. These courts agree that in general
the facts alleged in the declaration are controlling, but qualify this
rule by adding that the insurer will be obligated to defend whenever
actual facts are brought to the attention of the insurer which would
require the insurer to defend if alleged.2 0
One may legitimately ask, it would seem, whether one party's contractual rights should be so absolutely determined by another party's
skill in pleading. Complications might well arise, for instance, if an
insurer refused to defend on the basis of the allegations of the original
declaration, but later would be required to defend when the declaration is amended. Should the insurer then be allowed to replace an
attorney whom the insured has retained in the meantime? Should it
19. E.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 226 F.2d 520 (6th Cir.
1955); Employers' Liab. Assur. Co. v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 214
F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1954); United States Sanitary Specialties Corp. v. Globe
Indem. Co., 204 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1953); Hardward Mut. Cas. Co. v. MasonMoore-Tracy, Inc., 194 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1952); Boutwell v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 175 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1949); Cametal Corp. v. National
Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1961); Bobich v. Oja, 104 N.W.2d 19

(Minn. 1960); Hersey v. Maryland Cas. Co., 102 N.H. 541, 162 A.2d 160 (1960);
Commercial Ins. Co. v. Papandrea, 121 Vt. 386, 159 A.2d 333 (1960).
20. See Albuquerque Gravel Prods. Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co.,
282 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1960); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Southwestern
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 283 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1960); Marshall's U.S. Auto
Supply v. Maryland Cas. Co., 354 Mo. 455, 189 S.W.2d 529 (1945).
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be allowed to dictate a change in trial strategy?
On the other hand, if an insured is allowed to question the truth of
the allegations of the declaration on such matters, might not insurers
find themselves confronted with the unpleasant task of investigating
a large number of cases in which coverage seems questionable?
Because of these and other opposing considerations, it is submitted
that only the passage of time will permit a fair assessment of the wisdom of the rule set forth in this decision. One must wonder, however,
if this holding has not placed the insured in an unfortunate bargaining
position both with the insurer and with the injured party, on whose
declaration he must rely when he seeks to persuade the insurer to
defend under the policy.
C. Good Health as a Condition Precedent
Closely allied to exclusions are conditions precedent. The language
of the two types of clauses is similar; the end effect is likewise similar
-if the clause is applicable, there is no coverage in the individual
case. In theory, however, the two are quite different. If a given fact
situation falls within an exclusion, there is no coverage for the particular case but the policy remains alive. If the facts reveal that a
condition precedent has not been met, however, the policy itself is
without vitality; no coverage has ever attached.
In Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Jackson2 ' it was held that the
policy never came to life, because a condition precedent was not met;
one must read the lengthy opinion in this case with some caution,
however, lest he suppose that the holding is based on another findingthat the insured was guilty of fraud in his application.
In April 1957, two industrial life policies were issued to James
Jackson without medical examination. The applications contained a
number of questions concerning Jackson's medical history. The answers which he gave indicated that he was then in good health. The
policies issued to him did not contain suicide clauses, but did state
that: "Within two years from the date of issue ...

the liability of the

Company... shall be limited to the return of premiums if the Insured
was not in sound health on the date of issuance .

. . ."

In May 1958,

Jackson shot himself. His widow applied for benefits under the
policy. The insurer refused to pay and filed this suit for rescission
of the policies on two grounds: (1) that in his applications the insured
had materially misrepresented the state of his health; (2) that at the
time the policy was issued, insured was not in sound health. The beneficiary answered and filed a cross-claim, alleging that insured was in
good health at the time of issuance and that even if this were not so,
21. 342 S.W.2d 720 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1960).
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the insurer had by its careless conduct waived any right to challenge
the policy.
The insurer offered proof showing that insured had consulted a
number of doctors for treatment of epilepsy both before and after
applying for the policies in dispute. One of these doctors testified that
he had first seen the insured on March 19, 1957, approximately a month
prior to the issuance of the policies, and that the tests made at that
time showed that the insured was probably epileptic. The defense
countered with testimony by the widow and close friends that they
had no reason to believe that the insured was in bad health at the time.
While this evidence indicates that the court could have rescinded
the policies because of fraudulent misrepresentations, neither the
chancellor nor the court of appeals for the western section chose to
follow this route. 22 Instead the courts relied on this rule: "Industrial
life insurance policies issued without medical examination, which
provide for no obligation other than the return of premiums received,
unless the applicant insured thereby is in sound health on date of
issue, are enforceable."23 Applying the rule to this case, the court
concluded that the evidence strongly supported the trial court's conclusion that the insured had suffered from epilepsy at the time the
policies were issued, and that therefore there was no coverage under
them.
The court also held for the insurer on the issue of waiver. The testimony recounted in the opinion indicated that the insurer's agents met
with the insured, asked him the questions on the application blank
which they filled in for him, had him sign the application which was
filled in in this manner, and also had him sign another application in
blank, on which they later filled in the same answers. The defense
claimed that this procedure-whereby the second application was not
filled in by the insured or in his presence-was so slipshod that the
insurer should be held to have waived any fraud on the part of the
insured and any non-fulfilment of the condition of good health. The
court disposed of this contention by pointing out that the proof offered
by the defense in no way tended to disprove the insurer's showing
that it had no knowledge that the insured was not in good health; this
was especially true since the insured had answered the application
form questions in such a way as to indicate that he was in the best of
health. Without knowledge of insured's poor health, the company
could not waive the condition. 24
22. "[T]he determination of fraud was pretermitted by the learned Chancellor for the reasons stated in his Opinion as herein shown, and it is likewise
pretermitted by this Court." 342 S.W.2d at 729.
23. 342 S.W.2d at 29.
24. 342 S.W.2d at 731.
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The decision would seem to be clearly correct. It is in accord with
2
reputable authority25 and with previous Tennessee decisions. 6

III. SERVICING THE CONTRACT
A. Change of Beneficiary
Mutual Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Cowan27 called for a decision
as to who was the beneficiary under a life insurance policy when the
insured had attempted to change the beneficiary but had been unable
to comply with all technical requirements for change provided for
by the policy.
The insured in the case was an army sergeant. Unmarried at the
time the policy was issued, he named his mother as beneficiary. Insured subsequently married, and a few months after his wedding was
sent to a new post in Germany. On June 7, 1959, he contacted an agent
of the insurer in Germany, advising him that the sergeant wished to
change his policy so that his bride would be the beneficiary. The
policy provided that the insured could make such a change by filing a
written request on a form to be provided by the company and then
returning the policy to the company for indorsement. The agent of
the insurer in Germany did not have the proper forms, so the insured
simply gave him the policy to be relayed to the insurer for indorsement and asked the agent to procure the necessary application forms.
The agent was slow in making this request, and the company's main
office was slow in relaying the forms to him; they did not arrive in
Germany until July 10, 1959. In the meantime, insured had been
seriously injured in an accident which occurred on June 9; he died
as a result of this injury on June 25.
In this case, the insurer has interpleaded the mother, the named
beneficiary, and the widow, whom insured apparently intended to
make his new beneficiary, asking the court to determine to whom
the proceeds of the policy should be paid. The court held for the
widow. In its opinion, eight Tennessee cases on the subject of changing beneficiaries are analyzed; from this analysis the court concluded
that this state is committed to the view that if an insured has done all
that he can to effect a change of beneficiary but does not comply with
all formal requirements through no fault of his own, but because of
the insurer's dereliction, the change will be considered effective. This
25. See e.g., 12 APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAw AND PRACTICE
PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 19 (1957).

§ 7352 (1943);

26. DeFord v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 182 Tenn. 255, 185 S.W.2d 617
(1945); National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Lewis, -19 Tenn. App. 459, 89 S.W.2d
898 (M.S. 1935).
27. 188 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Tenn. 1960).
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"substantial compliance" doctrine follows from applying the equity
maxim: "Equity regards as done that which ought to be done.128
In this instance, the court concluded that the insured had done as
much to bring about a change of beneficiary as was feasible. It was
the failure of the insurer to equip its agents with proper forms coupled
with the tardiness of agent and company in supplying the forms that
caused the insured not to observe the formalities.2 9 Insured's intention to change the beneficiary was felt to have been clearly shown,
even though there was no writing to this effect signed by him.30 Therefore the wife of the insured was held to be entitled to the benefits.
The holding is clearly right; it is in line with the great majority of
31
recent American cases.
B. Effect of Statute of Limitations on Liability to Third Parties
What is the proper statute of limitations to apply between a liability
insurer and an injured party who has obtained judgment against the
insured? In the case of Melloan v. Southern Fire and Casualty Co.32
plaintiff had obtained a judgment against the defendant's insured in
1952, but did not seek to obtain payment from the insurer until 1959.
The insurer refused to pay, relying on the six-year statute of limitations for contracts. 33 Plaintiff has prosecuted this suit on the ground
that the ten-year statute of limitations for judgments should be applied.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the holding of the
chancellor in favor of the insurer, ruling that the contracts statute of
limitations was that which should be applied. There would seem to
be nothing inherently wrong in this decision; it is in keeping with
Tennessee's rather strict third-party beneficiary interpretation of liability insurance.3 However, one must quarrel to some extent with
28. 188 F. Supp. at 150. The court's review of the previous decisions is excel-

lent and should serve as a practical aid to attorneys with problems in this
area.
29. 188 F. Supp. at 152.

30. 188 F. Supp. at 153. The doctrine of substantial compliance should not

be applied unless there is convincing proof that the intent of the party to
change the policy was fixed. A writing would doubtless be the best evidence.
A delivery of the policy to an agent of the company, as in this case, would
seem sufficient in most cases.
31. See 2 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE 365 n.48 (1941); PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAw § 50, at 217 (1957); VANCE, INSURANCE §
109(c) (1951).

32. 337 S.W.2d 452 (Tenn. 1960).
33. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-309 (1956): "[A]ctions on contracts not otherwise
expressly provided for, shall be commenced within six (6) years after the
cause of action accrued." The problem of the precise date at which this cause
of action accrued was not discussed.
34. For illustrations of the third-party beneficiary approach, see Hartford

Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Partridge, 183 Tenn. 310, 192 S.W.2d 701 (1946) (the
rights of the injured party held "derivative, rising no higher than those of

1961]

,INSURANCE

1315

the court's use of authority. For instance, the court quotes from volume 53 of Corpus Juris Secundum section 44--"as a general rule
statutes of limitations applicable to contracts govern actions on insurance policies"-but does not mention that the footnotes to this section
list among the exceptions to this general rule "injured person's action
on indemnity policy." Similarly the court quotes from Blashfield,
Cyclopedia of Automobile Law section 4112.65 to the same effect, without noting that in the same section there appears the statement: "It
has been held that, for the purpose of determining the applicability of
statutes of limitations, an action by the injured person against a
liability insurer is basically a tort action." This failure on the part of
the court to treat its authority more critically does not mean that it
reaches a wrong decision; it is unfortunate more because it may mislead the practitioner who is given an incomplete picture of the status
of authority in other states.
C. Duty To Settle
Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wood- was an action
by an insured to recover amounts paid by him on a judgment obtained
against him in a suit by an injured party. Plaintiff claimed that the
defendant insurer acted in bad faith by not settling within policy
limits when it could have done so, thereby forcing the case to trial in
which a judgment in excess of limits was rendered against plaintiff.
The company contended that it acted in good faith and that plaintiff
had so misrepresented the facts to the company prior to the trial of
the damage suit that the insurer's task of defense was made impossible. The trial court overruled defendant's motion for a directed
verdict, and the jury returned a judgment against the insurer. The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the decision on two
grounds: First,that the facts presented in the trial court were such
that reasonable men could differ on whether or not the insurer acted
in good faith; Second, that in all events the insurer waived the defense
of non-coverage because of breach of the duty to cooperate since it
defended the suit and paid up to the policy limit without giving any
notice of disclaimer.
Judge Weick dissented, arguing that the conduct of the insured in
this case had been so inconsistent and so confusing to the insurer that
the company was entitled to a directed verdict, since it could reasonably have felt that on the basis of certain of insured's statements a
jury might have found no liability in the damage suit. The dissenting
the named insured"); Horton v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 179 Tenn.
220, 164 S.W.2d 1016 (1942) (violation by insured of cooperation clause held
available as defense to action by third party).
35. 277 F.2d 21 (6th Cir. 1960).
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opinion did not reach the waiver point.
On the matter of waiver, the court made two interesting statements:
(1) "If an automobile liability insurer assumes and conducts the
defense of an action brought against the insured, with knowledge
of facts taking the accident or injury outside the coverage of the
policy, without disclaiming liability or giving notice of a reservation of its right to deny coverage, such insurer is thereafter precluded in an action upon the policy from setting up the defense
of noncoverage."
(2) "Where an insurer, with knowledge of the breach of a condition, pays the amount of a loss into court on an interpleader, or
pays, or partially pays, any loss under the policy, it recognizes the
policy as still in existence and must be considered to have waived
its defense of a claimed breach."36
While the court cited no Tennessee cases in support of either proposition, there is some precedent for at least the second statement. 37 Attorneys in the state should take care to explain this doctrine so that
insurers will be aware of the possible consequences of their acts in
regard to payment.
36. Id. at 37.
37. Deming v. Merchants' Cotton-Press & Storage Co., 90 Tenn. 306, 17
S.W. 89 (1891).

